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Abstract
This article analyzes the consequences of environmental tax policy under public
debt stabilization constraint. A public sector of pollution abatement is nanced
by a tax on pollutant emissions and/or by public debt. In the same time,
households can also invest in private pollution abatement activities. We show
that the economy may be characterized by an environmental-poverty trap if
debt is too large or public abatement is not su!ciently e!cient with respect to
the private one. However, there exists a level of public abatement and debt for
a stable steady state to be optimal.
JEL classication: H23, H63, Q56.
Keywords: Environmental taxation, public and private abatements, public debt,
trap, optimality.
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1 Introduction
The growing environmental concerns have forced several countries to adapt their
tax structure by introducing new taxes on pollutants. France, following some
Scandinavian countries like Sweden, has planned to adopt a carbon tax on en-
ergy use in the next few years. The revenues of these green taxes are used to
limit the economic distortions of the reform by reducing other taxes, or alter-
natively, are allocated to pollution abatement programs. In France, the main
environmental protection agency (ADEME) is entirely nanced1 by revenues
of taxes on pollutants, called General Tax on Polluting Activities. However,
whatever the government’s decision about distribution of the environmental tax
revenues, public engagements in the environmental protection are often con-
strained by long-term scal objectives which impose to control public decits
and public debt evolution. The aim of this paper is to analyze the economic
consequences of environmental policy under a debt stabilization constraint.
Alongside the rise of the public expenditures for environmental protection
concerns, households have also massively increase their environmental spending.
Households’ environmental actions were initially limited to the purely personal,
e.g. protection of homes against noise pollution, lawn and garden maintenance,
individual wastewater purication of homes not connected to a collective sewage
system. But these actions are nowadays widened to the entire environmental
eld: combating biodiversity loss, sorting and recycling waste, ghting air, wa-
ter, and ground pollution. This increasing engagement of individuals in envi-
ronmental protection corresponds to an increasing demand for more and more
environmental requirements in the OECD countries. In France, over the period
1990-2003, households’ spending for environmental protection has increased on
average by 3.5% per year while public spending has increased by nearly 7%
1Its budget is about 1% of the french GDP.
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per year. Thus, the growth of total expenditure in environmental protection is
between 3% and 6%, and even approached 10% in the years 1993-1995. At the
same time, GDP only grew by an annual average rate of 2%.2
Based on these observations, our objective is to study the consequences of
environmental tax policy on capital accumulation, environmental quality and
welfare, when households also invest in pollution abatement. Does the increase
of the public environmental engagement lead to a green crowding out eect, pe-
nalizing hence private involvements in the environmental protection? When the
environmental policy is characterized by environmental taxation and public pol-
lution abatement sector, does it still respect the debt stabilization constraints?
We extend the model developed by John and Pecchenino (1994)3 to take into ac-
count public abatement. This paper has introduced pollution externalities in an
overlapping generations model à la Diamond (1965), where the behavior of self-
ish individuals generates intergenerational ine!ciencies and inequities.4 Since
we intend to study the interactions between voluntary commitments of individ-
uals and government’s intervention in environmental protection, we focus on an
economy where households are involved in environmental maintenance, through
a trade-o between polluting consumption and environmental quality, alongside
public actions to protect the environment. We further assume that government
spending is nanced through a tax on polluting consumption on one side, and
public debt on the other side. This means that a share of public environmental
abatement is nanced by future generations. Basically, we assume that genera-
tions who will benet from the public environmental protection should pay for
it. This assumption corresponds to a beneciary-payer principle, enhancing the
willingness to implement the environmental policy. Indeed, one of the results
2See Ifen (2006).
3Ono and Maeda (2001) introduce uncertain lifetime in such a framework to study the
consequences of distribution of ages among agents on the environmental quality.
4 See Solow (1974, 1986) for seminal contributions.
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of the previous literature is to show that environmental taxation implies such a
welfare loss for present generations that its implementation cannot be wished:
one of the generation who would decide it would also bear the heaviest burden.
Finally, we also consider a debt stabilizing constraint that imposes a constant
level of debt (per capita)5 and allows us to treat debt as a policy parameter.6
Using this framework, we show that if public debt is low enough and pub-
lic abatement su!ciently e!cient, the economy monotonically converges to a
long-run steady state. On the contrary, when public debt is not too low and
e!ciency of private maintenance is su!ciently high with respect to the public
one, an environmental-poverty trap can emerge. Indeed, the capital stock may
decrease because a large share of saving is devoted to maintain debt constant
and households increase their labor income share dedicated to ’green’ invest-
ment, through private abatement. This a priori negative eect of public policy
is mitigated by the welfare analysis. Indeed, we show that the optimal sta-
tionary allocation can be decentralized choosing appropriately the two policy
instruments, public abatement and debt. They both aect the consumption tax
rate, which is endogenously determined by the intertemporal budget constraint
of the government. However, government spending has also a direct impact
on environmental quality as it corresponds to public abatement, while debt is
linked to productive capital since it captures a share of saving.
Previous papers have analyzed the consequences of some environmental pol-
icy on environmental quality, growth and welfare. Nevertheless, in all these
studies, public and private choices for abatement are always exclusive.7 In par-
ticular, they have focused on the consequences of environmental taxes whose
revenues are redistributed to households. In John et al. (1995), the optimal
5There is no population growth.
6 See Diamond (1965) for a seminal model without any environmental externalities.
7The distinction between households and (short-lived) governments is not precisely dened
in this literature.
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policy relies on a tax scheme composed of taxes on labor and capital incomes.
In the same manner, Ono (1996) shows that the optimal allocation can also
be achieved by a combination of taxes on consumption and capital income. In
these papers, the authors develop the economic policy tools to reach the opti-
mal capital stock and environmental quality simultaneously. The e!cient pol-
icy rules have to inuence the saving-abatement private arbitrage in that way.
Therefore, the economy experiences a sustainable path. As in our article, we
consider both private and public abatement technologies, we allow for interac-
tions between these two environmental involvements, which may even generate
an environmental-poverty trap. Nevertheless, public debt is considered as an
economic policy tool which could help to reach economic e!ciency. Therefore,
in contrast to John et al. (1995) and Ono (1996), optimality is obtained with
a unique tax rate. Another dierence with our paper is the absence of public
debt to nance pollution abatement sector. However, debt has already been
introduced in dynamic models with environmental concerns (Bovenberg and
Heijdra (1998), Heijdra, Kooiman and Ligthart (2006)), but these contributions
focus on a dierent issue than ours. Instead of using debt to nance a share
of public maintenance, debt policy makes possible to redistribute welfare gains
from future to existing generations. In our model, the role of the public debt is
twofold: as usual, it redistributes welfare among existing and future generations,
but rst of all, it also nances the public pollution abatement sector. Hence,
the redistribution properties of the public debt are limited by the environmental
engagement of the government.
In the next section, we present the model. The intertemporal equilibrium is
dened in Section 3. The fourth section looks at the dynamics, while Section 5
is devoted to the long-run welfare analysis. The last section concludes. Several
technical details are relegated to the Appendix.
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2 A simple overlapping generations model
We consider an overlapping generations model with discrete time, w = 0> 1> ===>+4,
and three types of agents: consumers, rms and a government.
2.1 Consumers
Consumers live for two periods and the population size of each generation is
constant and normalized to one. Preferences of an household born at period w
are represented by a simple log-linear utility function dened over future con-
sumption fw+1 and environmental quality Hw+1:
oq(fw+1) + oq(Hw+1) (1)
where   0 is a measure of the degree of “green” preferences.
At the rst period of life, an household born at period w supplies inelastically
one unit of labor, remunerated at the competitive real wage zw, and shares his
labor income between saving hw, through available assets, and positive environ-
mental abatement pw  0. At the second period of life, saving, remunerated at
the real interest factor uw+1,8 is used to consume the nal good and pay con-
sumption taxes, at a rate  w+1  0. Hence, a consumer faces the two following
budget constraints:
zw = hw +pw (2)
(1 +  w+1) fw+1 = uw+1hw (3)
We further assume that private consumption degrades environmental quality,
while private environmental abatement and public spending, i.e. public envi-
ronmental abatement, Jw  0 can improve it. Assuming linear relationships,
environmental quality follows the motion:
Hw+1 = 1pw + 2Jw  fw (4)
8We assume complete depreciation of capital after one period of use. Therefore, uw+1 also
denotes the real interest rate.
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where  A 0 represents the rate of pollution coming from private activities, while
1 A 0 and 2 A 0 are measures of the e!ciency of private and public abate-
ment, respectively. Note that, as soon as 1 6= 2, private and public abatements
have distinct eects on environmental quality. This representation of distinct
techniques and/or of distinct productivities for the environmental protection9
may be illustrated by many examples. Indeed, households spending is geared
primarily toward curative actions (soundproong, wastewater treatment, waste
separation) while public spending is more preventive (air purity protection, pro-
tection of biodiversity, species conservation). Considering distinct consequences
of public (2) and private (1) abatement may refer, for example, to the case
of urban pollution and environmental performance of cities: without specic
maintenance, the quality of the urban environment will degrade. Users would
then derive less value from public parks, planted pathways, ower gardens, bi-
cycle tracks, etc. Therefore, the municipality supports the preservation of the
environment by replacing and maintaining trees, grass and owers in public ar-
eas, while private agents intervene directly themselves (lower quantities of waste
by collection and sorting, reduction of gaseous pollutants through investment
in power saving appliances and fuel e!cient cars).
Notice that Hw+1 can be interpreted as pollution. Assuming that Hw+1
does not depend on the current level of environmental quality Hw means that
pollution is a ow or a stock with full regeneration after one period. Regarding
the main pollutants, like sulphur dioxide, suspended particulate matter, carbon
monoxide, and for some sorts of river pollution, although all these pollutants are
stock pollutants, they all have short lifetimes and can therefore be considered
as ow pollutants from a long-run point of view (IPCC (1996), Liu and Liptak
(2000) and Lieb (2004)). In the atmosphere the lifetime of sulphur dioxide is
9 In the following, we do not distinguish between pollution abatement and protection or
maintenance of the environment.
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no more than four days and that of carbon monoxide is about three months.
Suspended particulate matter is washed out by rain and thus has only a short
lifetime. Since rivers are owing, the concentrations of water pollutants would
quickly decline if emissions stopped. So river pollutants are short-lived. Thus
they can also be considered as ow pollutants. Since we consider an overlapping
generation model with two-period lived agents i.e. the length of period is quite
large, this does not seem to be too restrictive to consider that Hw+1 does not
depend on Hw.10
A consumer maximizes his utility function (1) under the constraints (2)-(4)
and pw  0. One obtains:
uw+1
1 +  w+1
Hw+1  1fw+1> (5)
with equality when pw A 0.
2.2 Firms
Taking into account that one unit of labor is inelastically supplied at each period,
the production is given by |w = nvw , where nw indierently denotes the capital
stock or the capital-labor ratio, and v 5 (0> 1) the capital share in total income.
From prot maximization, we get:
uw = vn
v1
w  u(nw) (6)
zw = (1 v)n
v
w  z(nw) (7)
2.3 Public sector
The aim of the government is to improve environmental quality, using public
spending Jw to provide public environmental abatement. To nance these ex-
penditures, as seen above, the government levies a tax on private consumption,
10Seegmuller and Verchère (2007) use a similar assumption.
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at the rate  w  0, or can use debt Ew. The intertemporal budget constraint of
the government can be written:
Ew = uwEw1 +Jw   wfw (8)
with E1  0 given.
In this paper, we focus on equilibria with constant debt or constant debt
per capita, i.e. Ew = E A 0 for all w  0.11 This avoids explosive debt paths.
This condition also ensures the long-term credibility of the environmental policy,
and allows to use debt as an economic policy instrument. We further consider
that public spending, which corresponds to the level of public abatement, is an
exogenous instrument for environmental policy, i.e. Jw = J  0 for all w  0.
Therefore, the budget constraint of the government (8) can be rewritten:
 w
u(nw)hw1
1 +  w
= (u(nw) 1)E +J (9)
3 Intertemporal equilibrium
In this paper, we are interested in the eect of public debt on the dynamics, but
also on the respective roles of private versus public abatement. This explains
that we focus on equilibria with strictly positive abatement pw A 0. Besides,
in contrast to many papers,12 an explicit condition is derived below such that
inequality pw A 0 holds along the whole dynamic path. We note also that,
as emphasized in the Introduction, positive private and public environmental
abatements are supported by an empirical evidence.
Equilibrium on the asset market is ensured by:
hw = nw+1 +E (10)
11See the seminal paper by Diamond (1965), which however ignores environmental issues.
12 See for instance Ono (1996) or Zhang (1999).
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Therefore, the budget constraint of the government (9) can be rewritten:
 w
u(nw)(nw +E)
1 +  w
= (u(nw) 1)E +J (11)
It denes the consumption tax rate as a function of capital:
 w =
E(u(nw) 1) +J
u(nw)nw +E J
 (nw) (12)
We are interested in an economy where public debt is larger than public
abatement:
Assumption 1 E  J  0.
Hence,  w  0 is satised if u(nw)  1J@E. This requires nw  n, with:
n  u1(1J@E) =
µ
vE
E J
¶1@(1v)
(13)
Using (6) and (12), we notice that (n) is strictly decreasing ( 0(n) ? 0), i.e.
the tax rate is counter-cyclical.
Assuming pw A 0, the consumer trade-o (5) writes:
Hw+1 = 1(E + nw+1) (14)
Substituting this expression in (4) and using (2), (3), (6), (7) and (12), we
obtain:
nw+1 =
1
1(1 + )
[(1(1 v) v)n
v
w +[]  K(nw) (15)
with
[  (+ 2)J (+ 1(1 + ))E (16)
We notice now that, using (2) and (10), pw A 0 is equivalent to z(nw)E
nw+1 A 0. This is satised if (1 v)nvw E A K(nw) holds, i.e. nw A n, with:
n 

(+ 2)J E
v+ 1(1 v)
¸1@v
(17)
Under the following assumption:
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Assumption 2 2 ?
v+1(1v)
J
³
vE
EJ
´v@(1v)
+ EJJ  2
n is strictly lower than n. This assumption simply indicates that for a su!-
ciently large level of public abatement productivity (2 > 2), private abatement
falls to zero. In that case, there is obviously no need for private protection, the
public one being highly e!cient.
We are now able to dene an equilibrium:
Denition 1 Under Assumptions 1-2, an intertemporal equilibrium with strictly
positive private abatement (pw A 0) is a sequence nw 5 (n> n], w = 0> 1> ===>+4,
such that equation (15) is satised, given n0 5 (n> n].
Therefore, the dynamics are driven by a one-dimensional dynamic equation,
where nw is a predetermined variable. Since Hw = 1(E + nw), this also deter-
mines the evolution of environmental quality.
4 Dynamics and environmental trap
We are now able to analyze the role of debt, public spending and the eective-
ness of private and public environmental abatements on dynamics. By direct
inspection of (15), we immediately see that two main cases may emerge, de-
pending on the sign of v  1(1  v). When v A 1(1  v), it is possible to
show that, under Assumptions 1-2, there is no steady state belonging to (n> n]
and no persistent trajectory staying in this interval. Therefore, we exclude this
case and we will focus on the conguration where:
Assumption 3 v ? 1(1 v).
For further reference, since K(0) = [@[1(1 + )], it is useful to note that
[  0 if and only if 2  20, with:
20  (+ 1(1 + ))E@J  (18)
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and [ ? 0 otherwise, where 20 ? 2 if E and J are not too far.
13 Since
20 A 1, positive values of [ requires 2 A 1. This means that if public and
private abatements have an identical e!ciency (2 = 1) or public abatement
is the less e!cient (2 ? 1), we have [ ? 0.
The following proposition examines cases where the economy converges to a
unique long-run steady state (see Fig. 1):
Proposition 1 Let
e2  v+ 1(1 v)J
µ
1(1 v) v
1(1 + )
¶v@(1v)
+ 
E J
J
Under Assumptions 1-3,
1. When 2 = 20 ? e2, there is one stable steady state given by n1 =h
1(1v)v
1(1+)
i1@(1v)
if EJE ? v
1(1+)
1(1v)v
;
2. When e2 A 2 A 20, there is one stable steady state n1 A h1(1v)v1(1+) i1@(1v)
if E and J are not too far.
Note that e2 A 20 requires a not too large E. Otherwise, n1 becomes smaller
than n. In this case, nw decreases until it reaches its lower bound n. Finally, if
E is too far from J, n1 may be larger than n. Then, nw grows until it reaches
its upper bound n.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition shows that, when [  0, there is at most one stable steady
state. Obviously, this occurs without government intervention (E = J = 0).14
This proposition shows that this is still relevant if public debt is not too large
13 Indeed, this requires E

E3J
E
v@(13v)
? v+1(13v)1(1+)
vv@(13v).
14 In this case, one converges to the steady state for all n A 0.
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Figure 1: Illustration of Proposition 1.
with respect to public abatement or, as underlined above, public environmental
abatement is su!ciently e!cient with respect to the private one (2 A 1).
Indeed, when the level of debt is not too great and private environmental
abatement not too e!cient, a large share of labor income is devoted to capital
accumulation, which fosters convergence.
Proposition 1 is also useful to deduce the impact of a (slight) increase of debt
or public abatement on the long run stable steady state. Since [ is increasing in
J, but decreasing in E, public abatement and debt have opposite eects on the
stationary capital stock. The rst one promotes capital accumulation, reducing
private abatement in favor of productive saving. In contrast, the second one
lowers capital at the steady state, because of a crowding out eect reducing the
share of saving through capital.
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When [ ? 0 (2 ? 20), two steady states, a stable one n1 A 0 and an
unstable one n2 (? n1), may coexist. However, when [ (2) is su!ciently close
to 0 (20), n2 is lower than n. In this case, Proposition 1 still applies. On the
contrary, when [ is negative enough or 2 su!ciently lower than 20, we show
that an environmental trap may emerge. To examine this possibility, we assume
that E and J satisfy the following inequality:
Assumption 4 [1(1v)v]v@(1v)[v+1(1v)] A [1(1+)]1@(1v)vv@(1v)E
(1 v)[1(1 v) v]
1@(1v)J.
This allows us to show the following proposition (see Fig. 2):
Proposition 2 Let
2vq  [+ 1(1 + )]
E
J
  (1 v)[1(1 v) v]
1@(1v)

v
1(1 + )
¸v@(1v)
b2  E JJ + v+ 1(1 v)J

v
1(1 v) v
1(1 + )
¸v@(1v)
Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 are satised. When 2vq ? 2 ? b2 with 2
close enough to 2vq, there exists two steady states, one is unstable (n2 A n)
and the other one is stable (n  n1 A n2). A saddle-node bifurcation occurs for
2 = 2vq (n2 = n1) and there is no steady state for 2 ? 2vq. In this last
case, nw+1 = K(nw) ? nw for all nw, and nw reaches the lower bound n after a
nite number of periods.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition establishes that, for 2vq ? 2 ? b2, there is a poverty
trap for all n ? nw ? n2. Since Hw = 1(E + nw), this also corresponds to an
environmental trap, where environmental quality degrades. Furthermore, it is
interesting to notice that since [ ? 0, Proposition 2 applies for 2  1, i.e.
16
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Figure 2: Illustration of Proposition 2.
public and private abatements have the same eectiveness or public abatement
is the less e!cient. Notice also that inequality [ ? 0 is strengthened by a high
level of public debt.
If public debt is su!ciently large, a low share of income is devoted to pro-
ductive saving. In this case, capital accumulation may decrease. This eect
is reinforced by a great e!ciency of private environmental abatement, because
in this case, households invest a large part of income in private abatement.
However, environmental quality degrades because of the consumer trade-o be-
tween consumption and environmental quality, which stipulates that this last
one evolves in the same direction than capital accumulation.
Therefore, being a source of environmental-poverty trap, it could seem that
the policy introduced in this paper should not be recommended. Analyzing
welfare at the steady state, we will see, in the next section, that this conclusion
17
may be mitigated.
5 Welfare analysis
As it is well-known, an overlapping generation economy may be characterized
by over or under-accumulation of capital. As it is emphasized by John and
Pecchenino (1994), the same happens for environmental quality: one may have
over or under-maintenance. We re-examine this issue, determining rst the
optimal stationary allocation. Then, we will see that this allocation can be
decentralized by an appropriate choice of our two policy parameters E and J.
We start by solving the planner problem. Using the two resource constraints:
f+ n +p = nv J (19)
H = 1p f+ 2J (20)
we get:15
f =
1(n
v  n)H + (2  1)J
+ 1
(21)
Substituting this expression in the utility function ln f+  lnH, the planner
solves:
max
n>H
ln

1(n
v  n)H + (2  1)J
+ 1
¸
+  lnH (22)
taking J  0 as given. Using the rst order conditions:
1
f
1
+ 1
(vnv1  1) = 0 (23)

H

1
(+ 1)f
= 0 (24)
we deduce that the optimal stationary allocation (en> eH) is given by:
venv1 = 1 / en = v 11v (25)
eH = 
1 + 
[1(env  en) + (2  1)J]
=

1 + 
[1v
v
1v (1 v) + (2  1)J] (26)
15We can also deduce the value of private abatement, given by p = [(nv3n)3(+2)J+
H]@(+ 1).
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where en ? n corresponds to the standard golden rule. We also notice that en A n
for 2 ? e2, with:
e2  v+ 1(1 v)J vv@(1v) + E JJ ? 2 (27)
Then, the optimal allocation corresponds to a stationary solution with strictly
positive tax rate ( A 0) and private abatement (p A 0).
We are now able to evaluate whether a steady state can be optimal. A
stationary solution is dened by n = K(n). Hence, the level of capital is optimal
if en = K(en), which is equivalent to [ = e[, with:
e[ = v v1v [v 1(1 v(2 + ))] (28)
There is a unique level of [, determined by a combination of the policy pa-
rameters J and E, such that the stationary level of capital is optimal. However,
since the inequality K 0(en) ? 1 always holds under Assumption 3, a steady state
monotonically unstable, n2, can never be optimal. In contrast, a monotonically
stable steady state, n1, can be optimal, for an appropriate choice of E and J.
Dierentiating the equation n = K(n) with respect to n and [, we get:
gn
g[
=
1
1(1 + )(1K 0(n))
A 0 i K 0(n) ? 1
Therefore, a stable steady state (n1) is characterized by over-accumulation
if [ A e[ and by under-accumulation if [ ? e[. In the rst case, the op-
timal allocation can be reached by increasing debt and/or decreasing public
abatement, while the opposite recommendation is relevant when there is under-
accumulation. Indeed, as already emphasized, J and E have opposite eects
on the stationary level of capital. Increasing public abatement, by reducing the
incentive to provide private abatement, raises productive saving, while increas-
ing debt lowers capital, because a smaller share of saving is devoted to capital
holding.
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At a steady state, the level of environmental quality is given by H = 1(E+
n), which is generically dierent to its optimal level eH. Hence, the question
we address now is the following: by an appropriate choice of the two policy
parameters E and J, can a decentralized steady state be optimal?
Proposition 3 Let
d2  [(2 + ) + 1(1 + )]1@
e2  [v(2 + ) 1(1 v(2 + ))]1@(v)
Under Assumptions 1-2, v ? 1(1 2v) and 
e
2  2 ? min{d2> e2}, wheree2 is given by (27), there is a unique value of the policy parameters E and J,
with E  J A 0, such that the stationary levels of capital and environmental
quality are optimal.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition shows that there exists a unique choice of public environ-
mental abatement and debt which allow to a steady state to be characterized by
optimal levels of capital and environmental quality. This provides an argument
in favor of the policy considered in this paper. We notice that this result arises
even if, in contrast to John et al. (1995) and Ono (1996), we introduce a unique
tax rate. However, there is still two policy parameters, E and J. In fact, J has
an impact through two channels, the level of public abatement on environmental
quality and the tax rate. The level of debt E aects the tax rate as well, but
also capital accumulation and private abatement because it captures a share of
saving.
We nally notice that e[  0 if and only if   e, with:
e  1(1 2v) v
1v
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In such a case, the optimal policy corresponds to a conguration when there
is a unique stable steady state. However, when  ? e, multiplicity of steady
states and a trap may not a priori be excluded.
6 Conclusion
Among several countries, non explosive public debt is a major constraint. Never-
theless, the growing concerns about the environmental degradation (biodiversity
losses, climate change...) lead many Governments to ght against pollution and
hence, to increase environmental spending. In many countries, the pollution
mitigation induces the adoption of environmental taxes bearing on households,
alongside with the increase of the individual environmental engagements.
In this paper, we show that, when the environmental tax is allocated to
environmental protection, and in the same time, it aims to stabilize public
debt, then the environmental public policy may lead the economy to a poverty-
environmental trap. Indeed, if the public debt is high enough, the stabilization
of the latter reduces households’ share of income devoted to productive saving.
This eect is reinforced by private abatement su!ciently productive with respect
to the public one. Indeed, households are encouraged to protect environment
instead of saving for future consumption. Nevertheless, welfare analysis shows
that, whatever the initial economic conditions are, there exists a unique value of
the policy parameters, namely the debt level and the public spending, such that
the decentralized steady state is optimal. This allows us to recommend that
policy-makers should carefully evaluate the e!ciency of private versus public
environmental abatements and the level of public debt before increasing their
environmental engagement and introducing new taxes.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Under Assumption 3, the function K(n) is strictly increasing (K 0(n) A 0)
and concave (K 00(n) ? 0). When 2 = 20, we further have K(0) = 0. In this
case, there is a unique strictly positive steady state n1 =
h
1(1v)v
1(1+)
i1@(1v)
solving the equation n = K(n). Moreover, using (13) and (17), we deduce that
n1 is smaller than n if E and J are not too far, such that EJE ? v
1(1+)
1(1v)v
,
and is larger than n if 2 ? e2, where e2 A 20 is equivalent to:
E ?
v+ 1(1 v)
[1(1 + )]1@(1v)
[1(1 v) v]
v@(1v)
We immediately see that this last inequality is satised if E is not too large.
We may also easily conclude that, since K(n) is strictly increasing and concave,
the steady state n1 is stable.
Finally, when 2 A 20, K(0) becomes strictly positive. Since the steady
state n1 is stable, it becomes larger than
h
1(1v)v
1(1+)
i1@(1v)
, but keep the
same properties than under 2 = 20. In particular, we still have n ? n1 ? n if
2 ? e2 and E and J are not too far.
Proof of Proposition 2
Using (15), we nd that K 0(n) = 1 is equivalent to n = nvq, with:
nvq 

v
1(1 v) v
1(1 + )
¸1@(1v)
Moreover, we have K(nvq)  nvq when 2  2vq. Since K(n) is strictly
increasing and concave, we deduce that K(nw) ? nw for 2 ? 2vq. In this case,
there is no steady state and nw+1 ? nw for all nw 5 (n> n].
Notice now that nvq ? n is always satised and nvq A n if 2 ? b2, withb2 A 2vq under Assumption 4.
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Therefore, when b2 A 2 A 2vq with 2 su!ciently close to 2vq, there is a
stable steady state n1 and an unstable one n2, such that n ? n2 ? nvq ? n1 ? n.
When 2 = 2vq, we have n2 = nvq = n1, which corresponds to the critical
point where the saddle-node bifurcation occurs.
Proof of Proposition 3
A steady state (nl> Hl) is optimal if nl = en and Hl = eH, i.e. [ = e[ andeH = 1(E + en). Using (16), (25), (26) and (28), this is equivalent to:µ
1 +  1 2@1
(+ 1(1 + )) + 2
¶µ
E
J
¶
= v
v
1v
µ
1 v(2 + )
v 1(1 v(2 + ))
¶
Let   (d2  2)@1. Since  A 0, E and J are uniquely determined by:µ
E
J
¶
= v
v
1v1
µ
+ 2 2@1  1
+ 1(1 + ) 1 + 
¶µ
1 v(2 + )
v 1(1 v(2 + ))
¶
which is equivalent to:µ
E
J
¶
= v
v
1v1
µ
[1 v(3 + )] + 1 [1 v(2 + )] + 2v@1
(1 v)
¶
Note that J A 0 for 2 ? 
d
2. Hence, Assumption 1 is satised if E  J.
This is ensured by 2  
e
2, where 
e
2 ? 
d
2.
Finally, we have seen that en ? n, but en A n requires 2 ? e2. Therefore,
to complete this proof, we need to show that the interval [e2>min{d2> e2}) is
non-empty. We have e2 ? 
d
2. Taking 2 = 
e
2, we obtain  = 1(1 v)@v and
E = J. In this case, the inequality e2 ? e2 is satised when v ? 1(1 2v).
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